Showing posts with label governance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label governance. Show all posts

Thursday, March 20, 2008

Information Security, Governance, Compliance and Safety Belts

The state of Victoria in Australia made wearing safety belts compulsory in 1970. This is now almost universal practice.

I don't know the exact statistics but a study done in South Africa found that more people used safety belts after it was made illegal to not use them than when it was left up to the driver.

The conclusion really is that people are more likely to obey a rule because it is law than because it may just save their life.

I think that the same is true with Information Security. It won't (necessarily) save your life but it is good practice. And yet companies are only doing it because it is now law.

The problem with this is that it is not accepted by people in their hearts. I know of people who drive around without their belts on and put them half on when they see a traffic cop.

The Information Security equivalent is jacking up your InfoSec program when the auditors come to visit and letting it slide when they are not around. Or making sure that they don't see some issues that you are well aware of.

I have seen a lot of complaints about PCI and SOX etc etc in the same way that people complain about "self protection" laws like safety belt laws. The thing is that the government is stepping in only because people are very bad at self regulation. Really, what a number of InfoSec experts are trying to promote is - understand why you need to protect yourself, understand how and abide by it. Do it for your company, not because the government demands it.

That way, not only will you be "compliant" and full of "good governance" but more importantly - your company will be safe.

Monday, July 30, 2007

Rape and the importance of S.o.D

In Information Security it is drummed into us how important Separation of Duties is.

I investigate security methods, security matrices and inform the Operations teams one what to do. I also measure what is being done. But I don't do it and I don't ever measure myself.

According to this article in the Times online paper the police are playing with numbers:

" ‘We were told by police officers that there is a general belief that if there is a reduction in the number of rape cases reported, they stand in line for promotion'."

So hence, "an investigation by The Times into child abuse has uncovered claims that some police officers are not recording all rape cases — in the hope that keeping statistics on the crime down will fast-track their careers."

The article goes on to say that the police are refusing to record the crimes or are recording them as common assaults instead.

The problem is that the crime is not receiving the same attention that it would have, had it been logged as rape. The victim also does not get the right medical treatment such as HIV treatment.

How do we get around this? Separate the duties. The police who investigate crime after it has happened should be rewarded for the number of crimes investigated. The police who prevent crime should be rewarded for bringing down the crime. That way, we all win.

Thursday, May 31, 2007

eNatis

It is pretty rare for the general public to know about the I.T. workings of a government department. For example - when you go to pay your water and lights account or get your passport all you want is the transaction to go through - you don't care if they are using "PTS.4" or "QUSI-XGT" to process the transaction.

You only really are aware of it when something goes wrong. Which it did at the Department of Transport who are the guys who register new cars, licenses etc. They ripped out the old "Natis" system and to great fanfare implemented the "eNatis" system. Which has been in the papers (Google News turns up 295 articles) because it didn't work.

The staff had no idea how to get it working. The capacity was overwhelming and the IT guys ran around trying to plug the holes and put up new servers to make sure everything worked. This , after it was live, with no way to go back to the old system.

It even led to the Minister flying down from the clouds above and doing something never done in the history of the ANC... apologizing. He hasn't admitted he is wrong - but he apologized none the less, which is a start. In fact, in typical government style the problem remains unsolved but there is a task team in place to investigate whose fault the mess is.

There are many lessons to be learned from this whole ordeal on how not to perform an upgrade including having a backout plan, educating users, having a test case, testing with worst case load expectations (not best case), doing proper governance before hiring IT developers, etc.

But now, a public newspaper has received an audit report of the system that was published before it went live and the have won a court case to be able to publish details in their paper. Apparently the system has no security controls in it which means that any person who uses the system has "root" access.

The government has tried to block the newspaper publishing the details in an effort to have "security through obscurity".

A TV show recently showed that there is little to no physical access control in the Department of Transport's public interfacing offices which means that for a bit of cash one can get access to the terminals.

I'm just relating what I've read. I don't know the extent of the security on the terminals or exactly how the eNatis system works but I am interested in this saga and will publish more when it becomes available to me.